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PREFACE 
The primary objective of this mini-thesis is to show that the new banking legislation, 
which was implemented in South Africa in February 1991, as the Deposit Taking 
Institutions Act of 1990 [hereinafter 11DTl 11], encouraged the trend towards larger 
financial institutions in South Africa. A further aim of this thesis is to find a variable 
that best represents a financial institution's performance and to use this measure to 
determine a relationship, if any, with an individual bank's size. The test is to be 
conducted utilising a sample of South African banking institutions. 
The concept of size versus performance has been considered often in myriad studies 
of financial institutions worldwide. However, it should be noted that studies regarding 
the performance of the banking industry in South Africa, are virtually non-existent. 
In Chapter 1, a brief history of world banking trends will be discussed, while in 
Chapter 2 we will deal with bank developments in South Africa, including an in-depth 
study of the DTI Act. In Chapter three, we survey banking literature and note 
particularly the methodologies employed in analysing the relevance of performance 
indicators, and the criterion used, to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
a financial institution. It is shown that at least fifty studies, between 1990 and 1993 
have purported to demonstrate, inter a/ia, the influence of government regulation on 
banking performance, economies of scale at banks, benefits associated with inter-
bank mergers, as well as the results of bank and non-bank mergers. 
Contemporary studies of the banking industry have also employed a variety of 
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measurement techniques to evaluate a bank's performance. This has entailed various 
approaches ranging from fundamental analysis to more sophisticated programming 
methodologies. Moreover research has attempted to discern the optimal level of 
efficiency, at an individual financial institution. 
The underlying objective of this mini-thesis is to reveal whether big banks perform 
better than small banks in South Africa. Here it is hypothesised that legislation, in the 
form of the DTI Act, has in fact given rise to bigger banks. Yet there is evidence, 
[Boyd and Runkle(1993)], that bigger banks are not better performing banks. 
Following in part from Boyd and Runkle, the performance criterion to be used, herein, 
is the price earnings (PE) ratio, while size is determined by gross advances. The aim 
of this enquiry is to look at an individual bank to gauge a relationship, if any, between 
size and performance. The expectation is that the bigger the bank the higher its PE 
ratio, because there is clear support for bigger banks in the DTI Act, as will be argued 
in Chapter 2 & 4. 
We utilise data from a sample of small South African banks and compare their 
performance with a sample of large South African banks. All the banks analyzed are 
publicly listed companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
The rationale for using the PE ratio was suggested by Robert C. Jones [(1991) (27)]. 
It was found that 11 ••• the price earnings ratio of a particular bank measured against 
some propriety evaluation, was the most effective discriminator for the bank 
industry ... " . Similarly Mary Barth et al [(1992) (42)] argued that an internal evaluation 
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of a bank using a profitability variable was fraught with problems 11 ••• because of the 
practice at institutions, of smoothing an earnings performance ... ". Therefore the most 
acceptable performance measure, it was argued, would come from an external 
evaluation. Barth's observation provides further support for the use of the price 
earnings ratio, as it is an externally-orientated performance measure. 
South African bank data has historically been difficult to obtain because of limited 
financial disclosures. On the other hand external data has been fairly accessible. 
South African banks have, until fairly recently, disclosed minimal financial information 
in their interim and annual financial statements. In some cases at smaller banks, an 
essential item such as earnings was never disclosed, until as late as 1990. The DTI 
Act enforces stricter disclosures and now regulates disclosure policies. The 
limitation associated with data availability, has enhanced the case for utilising openly 
obtainable bank data, such as the PE ratio and gross advances. Various methods 
have also been tried for presenting the data but in the end we settled on the 
approach of adopting a graphic representation, since the limited data size of the SA 
bank sample restricted the number of statistical techniques that could be employed. 
In this study, each individual bank's performance is plotted for the period, 1988 to 
1992 and then an average sample of big banks and an average sample of small 
banks are compared over the same period. This is illustrated in Chapter 5. 
The period observed has relevance, even with the limitations attached to the sample 
size. This period represented a time when financial institutions began operating with 
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a view to the more rigorous legislative guidelines to follow, based on the DTI Act. 
In addition, the loosening of other laws, such as merger and acquisition legislation, 
allowed bank management and its shareholders to reveal their preference in relation 
to bank size. This is discussed in Chapter 4. Support can also be gathered for the 
fact that the South African Reserve Bank, under whose auspices bank supervision 
presently falls, seemingly prefers larger financial groupings, as is noted in Chapter 
2. 
The results lead to the conclusion that "niche" banks or more correctly "a niche focus" 
is the most effective strategy in the banking industry. I will further discuss whether 
size is a significant factor in the financial sector. This will be developed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5. 
I wish to thank my supervisors Doctor Hugh High and Tony Leiman. In addition I 
acknowledge the support of Professor Grahame Barr in deciding on a suitable 
method or presenting the data. Finally I must also thank both Doctor Craig Friedman 
and Professor Haim Abraham, whose courses during the Taught Masters in 
Economics helped me fashion conclusions to this thesis. Outside the academic 
environment I wish to thank South Africa's two leading bank analysts, Richard Jesse 
of stockbroking firm Martin & Co and Alan McConnochie of Ed Hern Rudolph Inc, for 




1 . Note that for the rest of this study the phrase DTI and Bank are considered 
interchangeable. Bank also adequately describes building societies and discount 
houses under the DTI Act, which was renamed the Banks Act in 1993. 
2. The clearest indication of the effect of the new DTI Act, has been the vastly 
improved financial disclosures, especially from smaller banks, since 1991. 
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CHAPTER 1 :- THE HISTORY OF WORLD BANKING 
1.1. Early History 
'Banking is of ancient origin, though little is known about it prior to the 13th 
Century.' [Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th Edition) (1986) (527)]. Many of the early 
banks dealt primarily in coins and bullion because their early business revolved 
around changing money and supplying foreign and domestic coin of the correct 
weight and fineness. Another important early group of banking institutions were 
merchant bankers, who dealt both in goods and in bills of exchange. A more 
pronounced procedure which developed around the 14th Century was the 
acceptance of deposits by banks. These were derived from the deposit of money or 
valuables for safekeeping or for purposes of transfer to another party. English 
bankers by the 17th Century, had refined the deposit banking business to include an 
interest rate payable for attracting coins and soon thereafter recognised the cheque 
and other bills of exchange. In 1664, The Bank of Stockholm was the first to 
introduce the practice of creating bank notes, in the foml of negotiable certificates, 
in exchange for coins and other deposits. [lbid (528)]. 
Earlier, in 1609, the structure of banking was revolutionised by the Bank of 
Amsterdam, which acted as a banker for the merchant traders, the Dutch East Indies 
Company. [Born (1984) (27)]. This bank first discovered the importance of being 
able to balance its cash liquidity with the risks associated with credit loans. This 
development arose when it was realised that, in a given period, only a portion of its 
borrowers and depositors would ask for their money in the foml of cash (silver coins). 
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If the proportion were 50%, then the bank could safely create claims for nearly twice 
as much as the cash in the vaults; this is now recognised as 'fractional reserve 
banking'. That process of creating credit could continue so long as a sudden loss 
of confidence did not have large numbers of depositors demanding their cash 
resources at the same time. However, if too many borrowers failed to repay there 
was another danger, for the bank would be unable to meet its commitments. 
In 1844 the fractional reserve banking system was legislated into existence with the 
passage, in the United Kingdom, of Peel's Bank Charter Act, named after the then 
Prime Minister Robert Peel. [Born (1984) (8)]. The Act was based on the Currency 
Theory of Ricardo and Lord Ovenstone, which considered bank notes to be money 
and two thirds of the notes in circulation were to be covered by gold. "The 
fundamental and trend setting significance of the Peel's Bank Charter Act 
lay moreover in the fact that it paved the way for a central issuing bank in England". 
[Born (1984) (8)]. However, the risks associated with fractional banking were 
highlighted in the economic crises of 1847, 1857 and 1866 with the Bank of 
England's gold reserve 11 ... [became] so badly depleted each time, that it had to 
ignore the cover regulations it had stipulated, to avoid denying the British economy 
credit". [Born (1984) (9)]. 
The United States (US) had no central issuing bank until the introduction of the 
Federal Reserve System in 1913 - 1914. [Born (1984) (176)]. In 1907, US banks 
suffered an economic crisis brought on by a massive failure in the copper commodity 
market. This crisis resulted, when a group of speculators brought eight banks under 
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their control to help finance their planned copper purchases. However, the price of 
copper dropped sharply, resulting in tremendous losses at these banks. [Born (1984) 
(180)] each one of the country's 274 banks acted independently to take preventative 
action as depositors lost faith in the banking system. Some had to suspend 
payments for weeks and months, while many other credit institutions accepted only 
partial cash withdrawals. However, by the time of the next. major economic crisis --
the Great Depression of 1929 - a central authority was already an established part 
of the US Federal Banking System and this allowed for a unified "reaction" strategy. 
It was the belief of banking authorities in the US, as well as those in the UK, that only 
a central authority could ensure a solid bank system. This led to the development 
of the 'lender of last resort' doctrine which, today, is an integral part of any 
reasonably sophisticated banking system. 
Throughout the early 20th Century financial links between continents continued to be 
forged. The Bank of International Settlement (BIS), founded in 1930, began with the 
concept of a unified global financial structure which would facilitate transactions 
between central banks of individual countries. However, the role of the BIS has 
widened and now takes broader considerations into account, including the 
macroeconomic policies of individual member governments, their microeconomic 
policies, as well as economic growth rates and trade policies. The BIS also advises 
on the necessary conditions to create financial stability and goes even further to 
extend finance to developing nations which adhere to these guidelines. The recent 
standardisation of banking legislation worldwide, to regulate and supervise banking 
practices, has gained momentum from the BIS. 
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In 1944 at Bretton Woods the basic outlines of the post-war international monetary 
system were conceived. A currency exchange mechanism was structured, based on 
a revised Gold Standard, which fixed the exchange rate of 35 ounces of gold bullion 
for one USA dollar. The conference at Bretton Woods also introduced two multi-
national monetary agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, whose tasks have been to encourage economic development, with financial 
support to less developed regions. 
The increasing importance of a central bank, served to promote a period of sound 
banking practices worldwide. Robert E. Litan, in his Frank M. Engel lecture in 1991 
noted: 
" ... it is no accident that the three most 
advanced economies in the world - the US, 
Europe and Japan - have the best developed 
financial systems, ... since the Great Depression 
providing lender-of-last resort assistance to 
promote consumer confidence ... " [Utan (1991) (4)]. 
1.2. A Revolution in Contemporary Banking. 
In the decade of the 1980's, financial institutions began to adopt more flexible and 
competitive, increasingly risk related, strategies to gain higher returns. [Utan (1991) 
(9 - 11)]. Incompatibility had arisen between the structure of financial systems and 
the economic environment in which they operated, inter a/ia, as a combined result of 
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inflation, high interest rates, downward-sloping yield curves and myriad binding 
interest ceilings as well as other restrictions on the behaviour of financial institutions. 
[Federal Reserve Bank of New York Study (1992) (2)]. The necessity for financial 
institutions to adapt to these changes provided the platform for the introduction, in 
the US, of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
The Act's primary objective was to move towards a more cor:npetitive financial system 
by relaxing or removing significant regulatory constraints at banks. Bank 
management responded by adopting a more competitive, free-market approach to 
the business of banking. Another introduction to the banking system, was the arrival 
of sophisticated technology. This development accelerated the speed with which 
information could be obtained; simultaneously there were advances in financial 
techniques, which offered superior risk/reward choices, inter a/ia in the option and 
future markets. 
In the study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it was noted that 
"Two developments in the 1980's contributed 
to financial innovation. The first was the 
ability of a bank to separate price (interest rate) 
and liquidity risk. The second was the 
greatly reduced cost of information processing, 
a change which allows financial firms to separate 
risk decisions from risk control and thus decentralise 
decision making" ... [(1992) (10)] 
Utan, inter a/ia, argues that the relaxation of banking laws culminated in the collapse 
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of the Savings & Loans institutions in the US in 1985. [Utan (1991) (9 - 11), (29 -
31)]. It has been estimated that this failure will cost the taxpayer about 260bn dollars 
in a payback package, being conducted throught this decade, to repay depositors. 
[Waldman (1990) (63)]. 
Litan commenting about this failure, said: 
" ... the banks and thrifts that lost hundreds 
of billions of dollars of depositors' money in 
the 1980's were obviously not run by prudent people. 
In many cases, it seems, they were managed and owned 
bycrooks ... 11 [(Utan) (1991) (1-2)] 
1.3 Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance was a fixture by the 1980's in the US. However this was not 
necessarily a safety mechanism and instead induced a moral hazard, as banks and 
saving institutions took on greater risk. Citing an example from Waldman [(1990) 
(44)], depositors at S & L's claimed $300m from the Federal Savings and Loans 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FLDIC) between 1934 and 1979, while in the 1980's 
alone this increased to $60 billion. The protection created by deposit insurance was 
being offset by the abuse of the insurance system. [Litan (1991) (5)]. This 
highlighted what could happen if the financial intermediation process was left alone 
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In South Africa at present there is no deposit insurance, although the South African 
Reserve Bank (SAAB) has always accepted its responsibility as the ultimate lender of 
last resort. In addition, there is evidence it provided some protection for depositor 
funds held at failed financial institutions. Specifically, in 1991, the SAAB extended a 
loan at virtually a zero interest rate to the troubled financial institution Bankorp and in 
the same time period, paid out depositors, after the liquidation of Pretoria bank. The 
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In South Africa at present there is no deposit insurance, although the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) has always accepted its responsibility as the ultimate lender 
of last resort. In addition, there is evidence it provided some protection for depositor 
funds held at failed financial institutions. Specifically, in 1991, the SARB extended a 
loan at virtually a zero interest rate to the troubled financial institution Bankorp and 
in the same time period, paid out depositors, after the liquidation of Pretoria 
bank. The 'deposit insurance', however, only covered the relatively small deposits, 
that is those below R5 million. In a public statement in the South African Financial 
Mail in July 1993 the Governor of the SARB, Dr Chris Stals, summed up its role in this 
regard: 
"The ultimate decision whether or not to assist 
a bank in financial distress will rest on the 
extent to which the bank system is endangered and 
on the availability of some form of deposit insurance 
scheme for small depositors." 
·-· 
A formalised deposit insurance system, in the US, contrasts with the covert approach 
to supporting depositors, which has been adopted by South Africa and most other 
nations. In addition, the US financial system has evolved with distinct variations to 
those systems in operation in the rest of the world. The most noticeable disparity is 
the fact that US banks have always adopted 'niche related' strategies. This is 
because US banks were prevented from expanding across state lines. Moreover 
institutional growth was inhibited because US banks were not permitted to hold equity 
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stakes in other companies and the deposit regulation agencies went as far as to limit 
branch operations; and finally, as a result of the introduction of different types of 
financial services companies, which occurred more rapidly and earlier, in the US, than 
elsewhere. [Utan (1991) (21 - 24)]. 
In the late 1980's the US joined with Japan and most Western European countries to 
standardise and supervise banks, in the Basie Accord. This Accord regiments, on 
a universal basis, capital adequacy requirements, associated with risk at financial 
institutions. Furthermore, the new Accords provide for bank holding companies, to 
diversify and grow through mergers and acquisitions in financial and non financial 
areas of expansion. [Utan (1991) (45)] 
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CHAPTER 2:- SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING AND THE ARRIVAL OF 
THE DTI ACT 
2.1. Early History 
The South African financial system has evolved from a situation whereby a shortage 
of coins existed in the country in 1793 so that coins had to be imported from Europe, 
to a situation 200 years later in 1993, whereby Automatic Teller Machines dispense 
the monetary unit of exchange. [Kelly (1993)] The first South African bank, called the 
Lombard or Loan Bank, was set up in the Cape colony in 1793, introducing paper 
money to Southern Africa to overcome the coin shortage. The Bank's primary 
function, at that time, was to dispense the notes which the government had issued. 
In the period from 1836 to 1861, 29 joint-stock finance companies were formed in the 
Cape Colony, the first being the Cape of Good Hope Bank in 1836. These financial 
institutions were under no obligation to furnish financial statements and all were 
entitled to issue notes without legal restriction. [Amat (1928)] 
In 1861 the so-called Imperial banks, of ~LJ~C?pean origin, entered the country and in 
1877 the Standard Bank of SA, with its parent company in Great Britain, was formed. 
Another banking institution of note to be formed in this period was the Nederlandsche 
Bank en Crediet Vereeniging voort Zuid-Afrika, renamed Nedbank in 1971 and De 
Nationale Bank Der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Beperk, now First National Bank Ltd. 
(Amat ( 1928)] 
In 1893 the first building society was formed with the amalgamation of three existing 
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savings institutions to form the United Building Society. Much later in 1991, the 
United Building Society merged with Volkskas Bank and Allied Building Society to 
form the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Ltd (ABSA). The South African Reserve 
Bank was founded in 1921 to fulfil its role as the protector of the external and internal 
valuation of the domestic currency and to ensure that a sound banking system 
prevailed. [Amat (1928)] Prior to 1949 there were virtually ~o facilities in South Africa 
for placing short term funds and most of these investments wre placed on the UK 
money market. In 1949 the National Finance Corporation was introduced to provide 
call money facilities and in 1955 the first merchant bank, Union Acceptances ltd 
(UAL), was formed. UAL is now a division of the Nedcor Bank Group Ltd. In 1957 
a National Discount House was established and in 1958 the first treasury bill tender 
began. Commercial bank instruments, such as Negotiable Certificates of Deposits 
(NCD's), appeared in 1964. During this period bank regulation included the use of 
credit ceilings to curtail credit demand. The disintermediation process was 
encouraged and a large amount of bank activity took place off the balance sheet. 
[Kelly (1993)] Deregulation from 1980 included the abolition of bank credit ceilings 
and in 1983 the Registrar of Cooperation (Roco), which endorsed the fixing of bank 
.... ··-···· 
charges, was abolished. Further as mentioned in Meijer [(1985) (40)]: 
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••• Low rates and yields on money market 
instruments relative to the commercial banks' 
prime and overdraft rates had been a prime 
element in accounting for the distintermediation 
phenomena. Conversely, comparatively high money 
market rates encouraged re-intermediation from late 1980.11 
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All these factors encouraged re-intermediation and intensified the competition for 
funds in the financial services industry. An overlap soon became apparent in the 
hitherto mutually exclusive businesses of a bank, which was recognised as a 
commercial and retail institution and a building society, which concentrated 
specifically on home loan finance. The De Kock Report [(1985)] was '~he starting 
point for levelling the playing fields between banks and bui~ding societies". [Rogers 
(1985) (70)]. This was finally achieved with the introduction of the Deposit Taking 
Institutions (DTI) Act on February 1 1991. 
2.2. The DTI Act 
The DTI Act was modelled on the banking act implemented in the United Kingdom, 
but was also based on the worldwide movement towards a more regulated banking 
system, as drafted in the Basie Accord. The Savings & Loans insolvencies and the 
Bank of International Credit & Commerce collapse were sufficiently significant in their 
impact, on a global scale, to warn of the dire problems associated with self-regulation 
in bank and allied industries. In South Africa, in 1990, poor credit and risk 
management policies led to the liquidation of Cape Investment Bank (CIB) and Alpha 
Bank, with Pretoria Bank and the Masterbond Group to follow in 1991. Masterbond 
is the country's largest financial disaster to date, with in excess of R1 billion in 
investment funds previously under its administration. [Ochse Report (1993)] 
2.2.1 Discount Houses 
The DTI Act has introduced a new era of tighter bank controls in South Africa. It can 
be considered as an all-encompassing act for Banks, Building Societies and Discount 
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Houses. The changes from the old system are manifold and intended to ensure 
added efficiency and enforce a conservative banking policy. One Act now governs 
three major pillars of the financial services sector. [DTI Act (1990)] Discount houses, 
the intermediary station between the SA Reserve Bank and commercial banks, have 
been eliminated. Their function was to buy predominantly financial paper, mostly 
bankers acceptances', at a price (discount) and pass the~e negotiable instruments 
along to the SA Reserve Bank (SAAB). This route was mostly shortcircuited, as the 
commercial banks invariably used the wholesale money market, or alternatively went 
directly to the SAAB. [Gidlow (1985)] The government recognised the redundant role 
of discount houses, by including them with banks and building societies, under the 
new DTI Act. Discount Houses were previously governed by an appendage to the 
old Banks Act of 1965. 
2.2.2. Building Societies 
The second component part of the DTI Act was that regulating Building Societies. 
These institutions were guided by the Mutual Societies Act until 1987 after which an 
additional Act, allowing for incorporations by mutual companies, was introduced. The 
main distinction between these two Acts is that the Mutual members, as holders of 
a mutual financial product, own the share capital while the Incorporations Act allows 
for public capital issues through JSE listings. Immediately thereafter, Allied Building 
Society, United Building Society (UBS), Natal Building Society (NBS) and Saambou 
Building Society went public with a listing on the Johannesburg Exchange. In 1988 
an amendment to the Mutual Societies Act made provision for banks to become 
controlling stakeholders in a mutual society. Incorporated societies were previously 
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restricted to funding 30% of their deposits in the short term, because of the long 
term nature of home loan business. The new DTI laws allow incorporated societies 
to set their own overall funding mix. 
2.2.3 Banks 
Banks had the lightest regulatory treatment under the. old Banks Act. Cape 
Investment Bank in its annual results reported sound profits (Cape Times 14 
September 1990) yet soon thereafter was placed in provisional liquidation. The 
reason for this anomalous treatment was based on the fact that banks historically had 
the protection of limited disclosure, which allowed them to reveal profits after cash 
flows to internal reserves. Income was allowed to flow unreported off financial 
statements to boost these reserves, which remained unrecorded and could, in turn, 
be used to inflate the earnings of a bank. The balance sheet of a financial institution 
revealed merely a rough asset and liability outline. The new Deposit Taking Act 
requires detailed information on, among others, these inner transfers to distributable 
and non-distributable reserves and, more importantly, banks must now reveal their 
trade/risk positions in the capital, money and derivative markets. Under Section 73 
(1) of the DTI Act the full board of directors of a bank is required to give its prior 
approval for each large exposure contemplated by the institution. This has been 
further amended so that the credit committee, of the institution, may also grant 
permission. Section 73 (2) makes it clear that the registrar's approval is not required 
for any decision of management concerning a large exposure. The decision on the 
appropriate level of risk thus rests with the shareholders of the bank. In this regard 
in South Africa most publicly-listed bank groups have an equity participation scheme 
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for their management and, in the case of the Investec Bank Group Ltd, it is, 
essentially, a manager-owned institution. 
2.2.4. Off-balance Sheet Activities 
In addition the new laws also strengthened legislation regarding repurchase 
agreements (repos). [DTI Act (1990)] A loophole in the previous Act allowed trade 
without detection in, among others, 'repos' and off balance sheet loans. A simple 
addition to the DTI Act forces banks to identify all assets, even those so-called off-
balance sheet assets or repurchase agreements, thereby effectively outlawing such 
activity. 
2.2.5. Moneybrokers 
The DTI Act is specifically aimed at deposit takers and this now also includes 
moneybroking intermediaries, which had previously fallen beyond the ambit of the old 
Banks Act. Furthermore, a strict interpretation of this law means that trust funds held 
at professional brokers, such as legal and accountancy firms, fall under the auspices 
of the DTI Act. The Policy Board for Financial Services & Regulation has 
recommended that these professional brokers should be allowed to follow the 
dictates of their own professional guidelines but with some security, in the form of 
deposit insurance, which is still being debated. A further recommendation is that the 
SAAB should now incorporate the Financial Services Board (FSB). The FSB 
regulates short and long term insurance, pension funds, unit trusts, participation bond 
schemes and portfolio management companies. Legislation for these sub-groups is 
also presently being debated. The regulation and supervision of banks, previously 
the responsibility of the SAAB, will now be included in the duties of the FSB. 
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2.2.6. Reserve Requirements 
From a technical perspective, the DTI Act emphasises risk management on both the 
asset and liability side of the balance sheet. [DTI Act (1990)] A 4% capital reserve 
requirement has been set for less risky assets, such as mortgage loans, while an 8% 
penalty applies for higher risk assets. The new conditions. are tougher than the old 
guidelines because, although some risk assets previously required a 10% backing the 
average was only 4%. The reserve requirement is now on average much higher --
an 8% requirement. The phase-in process for capital asset requirements, besides 
mortgage loans, is 4.5% in 1991, 5% and 1992, 6% in 1993, 7% in 1994 and fully 
phased in at 8% of capital to asset holdings in 1995. Mortgage loans will carry half 
these capital requirements in each year. This implies that the actual required 
weighting, once fully phased in, is 100% for a risk asset, 50% for a mortgage loan 
and zero for cash balances and short dated stock. On the liability side the structure 
is more compact and as a result there is greater efficiency. Previously liablilites were 
split into three bands: the short term (31 days), medium term (32 days to one year) 
and long term (beyond one year). In each of these periods, previously, the stipulated 
cash reserve requirements were 5% and the liquid requirements were 20%. This ratio 
was reduced to 2% and 15% respectively, in the medium term. In the long term there 
were no cash reserve requirements but there was a 5% liquid asset requirement. The 
arrival of the DTI Act sees the different time bands fall away. Short term cash 
reserves now carry a 4% capital backing, kept as a balance with the Reserve bank, 
while liquid asset holdings have a 20% requirement. No further restrictions are 
deemed necessary in either the medium term or long term. 
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2.2. 7. Increase in Permissable Bank Shareholdings 
Another introduction under the DTI Act is the increase in permissable stakes in 
approved finance companies. Historically, under section 37 of the old Banks Act 
" ... the permission of the Registrar had to 
be obtained if a proposed acquisition of. shares 
in a bank or controlling company would render the 
applicant's shareholding, together with any shares 
already held by him or his associates, in excess of 
10% of all issued shares of the bank or controlling 
company. This process had to be repeated when further 
proposed acquisitions of such shares would cause the 
person's shareholding to exceed 17,5%, thereafter at 
25% and following from that at 30% 11 • 
In the last mentioned case permission of the Finance Minister was required. The 
initial limit has, under Section 37 of the DTI Act, been increased to a 15% 
shareholding, the intermediate stage of 17,5% has been left out and special 
permission of the Finance minister is now only required once more than 49% of a 
bank or controlling company's issued shares were acquired by any person and 
further permission is required when increasing that shareholding beyond a 74% stake. 
A Bank Holding Company (BHC) may now purchase another bank, building society 
and/or discount house, after meeting the requirements laid down in Section 30(a) and 
Section 37 of the Act. In addition, after fulfilling certain requirements as detailed in 
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Section 73 and 7 4 of the Act, a BHC may take up as much as a 49% stake in a non-
bank financial institution. 
Further, In April 1991, the then Finance Minister Mr Barend du Plessis announced that 
ownership rules would be further relaxed, which would encourage overseas 
investment in this country and outward investment by domestic banks. The change 
from previously strict ownership conditions in the banking sector has increased the 
concentration of bank groups in the industry. The monetary authorities have 
encouraged this merger and acquisition trend, stating openly that the policy of the 
SARB is to encourage greater concentration in the private banking arena to provide: 
11A solid shell around the SARB" (Cape Times 4 February 1991). 
A final introduction which has occurred in recent times, and been incorporated in the 
SA Government's Budget of 1991, is a new form of Value Added Tax requiring banks 
to charge their customers an additional 0,75% further tax on interest income. The 
application of this tax was subsequently revised to permit banks to calculate the 
0,75% tax on the fully phased in capital required, in each transaction. In 1992 a 
regulatory framework for commercial paper and securitisation was formally 
established to enhance the ability of domestic banks to undertake international 
finance transactions. In 1993 the 'DTI Act' reverted back to being named the 'Banks 
Act'. 
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CHAPTER 3:- A CRITIQUE ON BANK THEORY 
The DTI Act should be seen in the context of the contemporary findings of bank 
theory. 
3.1. Deposit Insurance Theory 
In recent years two important studies on the theory of the· banking firm have been 
developed. Both purport to predict relationships between the size of banks and their 
performance. One substantial theory concerns bank behaviour in the presence of 
deposit insurance and the effect that such insurance has on bank decisions. 
Fundamental arguments by, for example, Merton [(1977)], Kareken and Wallace 
[(1978)], Sharpe [(1978)], Flannery [(1989)] and Chan, Greenbaum and Thaker 
[(1992)] are that deposit insurance produces an incentive for insured banks to take 
on more risk. Theoretically in fact this approach pushes banks to cornerstone 
solutions, taking as much risk as they can, for example through financial leverage 
(gearing). Banks in this context are viewed as portfolios of risky claims. Their 
production technologies are unimportant and size plays no role in the theory. The 
extrapolated theory suggests that large bank failures are supposedly more feared 
than small bank failures, since the big bank failures are more likely to result in larger 
macroeconomic externalities. This leads to a ''too big to fail" policy, with the liabilities 
of very large banks being de facto guaranteed. Banking authorities do not permit 
large banks to default on debt, based on the understanding that creditors of the bank 
will be reimbursed by the government and/or central bank. Asymmetrical support for 
big banks, according to this theory, allows big banks to receive a greater net subsidy 
than do smaller banks. 
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3.2. Modern Intermediation Theory 
Another recent study, Modern Intermediation Theory, deals with the economic role 
of banking firms in an environment in which agents are asymmetrically informed. 
This theory predicts that large intermediary firms will be less likely to fail than small 
intermediaries because of economic, and -- some argue -:- social, efficiency gains 
related to size. The 'social aspect' comes from a bigger bank's ability to provide, 
inter alia, more jobs with greater employee security and benefits. Scale efficiencies 
at banks are covered in literature including studies by Diamond [(1984)], 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor [(1984)], Boyd and Prescot [(1986)], Williamson [(1986)] 
and Allen [(1990)]. In this theory, the advantage of size is that is means that the 
intermediary can contract with a large number of borrowers and lenders. Large 
numbers are assumed to result in diversification, which is valuable because it reduces 
the cost of contracting with asymmetrically informed agents. Diversification is even 
more valuable when agents are risk adverse. In such an environment diversification 
remains valuable, even where agents are all risk neutral, because of inter alia the 
lower costs attached to contracting with many asymmetrically informed agents. 
[Diamond (1984)] 
In many models it is assumed that borrowers, but not lenders costlessly observe 
investment return realizations. Uncertainty about return realizations is undesirable, 
and bad realizations trigger costly ·information production. The argument is that a 
diversified bank group reduces the costs of information production. A further 
argument is that if a large number of different investments are made in a single 
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intermediary, pooled risk is reduced or eliminated. What is predicted, then, is an 
inverse relationship between size and the probability of failure. In addition, 
diversification reduces the ex ante expected costs of overcoming information 
asymmetries. This results in cost savings which are realized whether or not failure 
occurs. The precise link between diversification and intermediation costs is, to some 
extent, model specific. In Diamond [(1984)], for example, contracting with many 
agents reduces the ex ante costs of verification. In Boyd and Prescott [(1986)], 
intermediaries produce information about the return distributions of investment 
projects before funding them. In that environment, large scale not only reduces 
contracting costs, it also permits intermediaries to fund the more profitable 
investments across a broader spectrum of alternative projects. 
The broadly defined Modern Intermediation Theory predicts that large banking firms 
will be less likely to fail and more cost efficient than small banking firms. One 
deficiency of Modern Intermediation Theory is that is has not provided adequate 
attention to the choice variable which partially determines the probability of failure, 
the return on assets. 
3.3. The Boyd-Runkle Study 
There have been a number of studies testing these two above-mentioned major 
schools of banking thought. The most recent if by John H. Boyd and David Runkle 
((1993)], who rested the predictions of both theories using a sample of 122 American 
banks for the period from 1971 to 1990. This paper will be described in greater detail 
since my testing of the SA bank industry was guided to some degree by this study. 
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The banks used in the Boy/Runkle test are, specifically, bank holding companies 
(BHC's), which, the authors argue, permits diversification because, as a parent 
organisation, it controls one or more banking subsidiaries and often nonbank financial 
intermediaries as well. This structure provides opportunities for diversification not 
available to an individual bank. Their approach has the obvious advantage of ease 
of interpretation because straightforward univariate prodecures are used. They argue 
that if the scale effects are sufficiently large to be of much interest, they should clearly 
be reflected in a market valuation. The market valuation is based on the return 
distribution of an individual bank holding company, as determined by Tobin's q. 
Tobin's q is defined as the market value of the firm's assets as a fraction of the 
accounting value of equity plus the accounting value of total liabilities, which is 
equivalent to the replacement value of assets. These calculations are considered by 
Boyd/Runkle to be accurate because the overwhelming majority of bank liabilities are 
considered to be short term deposits. For such deposits, book value is a close 
approximation to the market value. In addition, relatively few bank assets are plant 
and equipment. Therefore the major deviation in the asset book value, from 
replacement value, is likely to occur in the loan and bond portfolios. A bank is 
considered to have failed in this environment when the return on assets becomes 
negative. Return on assets is defined as the market value of profit over the mark,et 
value of assets. The market value of profit, in turn, is defined as the dividend 
payment in the current time period plus the share capital appreciation between the 
prior and current period. A probability distribution measures the likelihood of failure, 
which is the risk factor, determined by the volatility of asset returns over a twenty year 
period. Boyd/Runkle divide the banks into four size classes, and banks with total, 
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assets of less than one billion dollars are excluded. The smallest category is 
between $1 billion and $3 billion and the largest category represents banks with 
assets of over $15 billion. The various size categories are measured against Tobin's 
q, return on assets and the standard deviation based on the volatility of the 
distribution of returns. They find that the smallest and second smallest categories of 
banks provided the highest return on assets and these two categories also had the 
highest return based on Tobin's q. The two largest size categories had a slightly less 
volatile return distribution over the twenty year period. The next step in their 
methodology was to regress these individual firm statistics over the natural logarithm 
of total assets, to provide a linear equation. The results showed in fact a negative 
relationship. However Boyd and Runkle point out that this test may be 11spurious11 
[(1993) (53)] because many of the smaller banks had very poor disclosures in the first 
part of the sample. They then split the 20-year time period into two equal parts and 
there is still no evidence that the smaller banks benefited from the limited disclosure, 
to enable them, to perform better in the first time period. In addition large bank 
failure rates were consistently higher than small bank failure rates in the sample 
period. For all class sizes there was a much higher failure rate in the 1980's, than the 
1970's. 
Their results show that no evidence exists to support the theory that large banking 
firms are less likely to fail, than are smaller banks. However, the data did show that 
an inverse relationship existed between size and volatility of asset returns, consistent 
with the predictions of Modern Intermediation Theory. Boyd and Runkle argued that 
this was because an inverse relationship exists between size and two other variables 
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-- the rate of return on assets and the ratio of equity of assets. In other words, larger 
banking firms are proportionately less profitable in terms of asset returns and 
proportionately more highly leveraged. Finally they found no evidence of a positive 
relationship between size and market valuation. 
3.3.1. Support for Boyd/Runkle Findings 
These findings have had support from work done by Kuester and O'Brien [(1990)], 
who found that the standard deviation of 225 bank holding companies had a negative 
relationship with size. Keeley [(1990)] found no significant relationship between size 
and Tobin's q, as defined. In addition, the regression by Keeley included several 
more explanatory variables, besides time period and size. However a study 
conducted by O'Hare and Shaw [(1990)] concluded that equity investors preferred, 
and therefore placed more value on, banks that would benefit from the 'too big to fail' 
policy. 
3.4. Merger Theory 
3.4.1. Inter-Bank Mergers 
Another important issue surrounding financial institutions is the effect of bank mergers 
and more particularly mergers between large institutions. Most studies of bank 
merger efficiencies compare simple pre-merger and post-merger financial ratios, such 
as operating costs divided by total assets, or the return on equity or assets. Recent 
studies covering the above include Roades [(1990)] and Linder and Crane [(1990)] 
who concentrated on input costs benefits from a bank merger. Savage [(1991)] 
simulated the pre and post-merger costs of a hypothetical merger using a cost 
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function to determine the potential effects of merger costs. All these studies found 
no benefits, on average, from mergers. However, Cornett and Tehranian [(1992)] and 
Spindt and Tarhan [(1992)] found a positive correlation between the measurement 
of output (revenue) and the benefits arising from a bank merger. Burger and 
Humphrey [(1992)], using a production frontier method to determine the efficiency 
effects of bank mergers, found insignificant benefits from bank mergers. 
Furthermore, they also found that this insignificance remai'ned, even when the 
merging banks were in the same market. Roades [(1993)] analyzed 898 horizontal 
bank mergers. His test also included a ·sample of banks that did not merge and both 
sample sets were analyzed, according to their performance, when measured against 
a simple expense ratio. No cost efficiency benefits were found from bank mergers, 
again, even with so-called in-market mergers. 
Shatters [(1993)] explored the source of future potential efficiency changes at bank 
institutions. He found that branch closures in the 21 O bank merger study would have 
a very small absolute effect on total costs. However, he argued that if managerial 
efficiencies could be transferred between merged banks, then cost savings would be 
large. The author points out that the results suggest that scrutiny be given to 
managerial talents of the acquiring bank prior to a merger. Fixler and Zieschang 
[(1993)] measured the productivity of bank mergers based on a value-weighted 
output index divided by a value-weighted input index. This method is equivalent to 
assuming that each bank has its own technology and thus measure efficiency gains, 
which come from comparing the quality of these technologies. They find that 
acquiring banks are 40% to 50% more efficient than other banks prior to merging and 
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they maintain that advantage in the years after the merger. This suggested that 
acquisition activity boosts the productivity and efficiency of the industry. One reason 
for Fixler and Zieschang's positive results on bank mergers is based on the revenue 
impact in the output index. Berger et al [(1993)] found that the difference in the 
output efficiency had a larger impact on the profitability function than on the input 
efficiency differences. 
3.4.2. Bank and Nonbank Mergers 
A merger between bank and nonbank activities has also been studied in depth. Larry 
Wall [(1987)], working with accounting data of 267 BHC's between 1976 and 1984, 
found that the probability of failure is greater in a nonbank subsidiary than in a bank 
subsidiary. However, he showed that due to the diversification effects -- the risk of 
BHC failure either does not change or declines "a bit'' [(1987) (27)] as nonbanking 
activities increase in importance. Utan [(1985)] argued that mergers of banks with 
nonbanks would be potentially risk reducing if the coefficient of variation for the 
nonbanking industry is small relative to that of the banking industry and if the 
coefficient between nonbank and bank earnings is negative. Results of the actual 
testing of this hypothesis were mixed. Kwast [(1989)] and Rosen [(19890] showed 
that the diversification gains from nonbank assets is relatively small. Kwast used the 
proxy of securities trading activities and found that the maximum diversification 
benefits were attained when nonbank securities, as a share of bank assets, ranged 
from zero to nine percent. Rosen studied the aspect of a bank and a real estate 
merger, which revealed no diversification benefits beyond four percent of real estate 
assets. A counter argument by US's Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
32 
[(1991)], for example, suggested that financial transactions can be quantitatively 
limited and fully collateralized while achieving the desired synergies in managerial, 
operational and marketing areas. 
John Boyd, Stanley Graham and Shawn Hewitt [(1992)] attempted to answer the 
question of whether BHC's should be permitted to enter nonbank activities as the 
' ' 
expanded non-banking powers could impact on BHC risk. Boyd et al argued that, 
on the one hand, portfolio diversification theory suggests that expanded powers 
would reduce the risk at a BHC. Yet, on the other hand, if the sought-after activity 
is inherently riskier than banking, the benefits from diversification could become 
negative, thereby increasing the risk of BHC failure. 
The authors point out that the relevance of this issue is based on the collapse of the 
Savings & Loans institutions in the US, where many firms in that industry used their 
new power in a way that increased risk. In their paper, mergers with life assurance 
companies were considered to reduce risk but mergers between BHC's and 
securities firms or real estate firms increased risk. The test was based on the risk 
effects of BHC entry into the above-mer1Honed industries. The test consisted of 
simulating mergers between banks and nonbanks and calculating certain risk 
measures and them comparing those risk characteristics with actual unmerged 
BHC's. Different portfolio weight tests were also conducted in the simulated merger 
between a bank and a nonbank. The simulation showed that mergers between bank 
and nonbank subsidiaries, defined as -- securities firms, real estate and insurance 
broking -- increased BHC risk at virtually anrportfolio weight. The simulation with 
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two other industries, life assurance and the allied property/casualty insurance, 
suggests that with a correct portfolio weight, risk-reducing diversification is possible. 
The authors conslusion was that those making public policy could minimize the risk 
of bank failure by only permitting BHC's to acquire life and property/casualty 
insurance firms, whilst prohibiting them from acquiring securities and real estate firms. 
3.5. Bank Performance Analysis 
3.5.1. Fundamental Analysis 
Another crucial issue in studies on the banking industry is the measurement of bank 
performance. A comprehensive fundamental study was conducted by Robert C. 
Jones [(1991)) to determine which component factors of a multi-factor model had the 
greatest impact on the broad spectrum of industry. Subgroups were defined by 
industrial sector for the sample period, 1969 to 1987. The component factors were 
value factors, yield factors, momentum factors, growth factors, risk factors and 
liquidity factors. All were then equally weighted to provide for the multi-factor model. 
The finance sector proved the most receptive to the value factors, in particular the so-
called K ratio, which is a propriety evaluation of a bank by comparing its 
fundamentals with that of the market valuation, defined here as price to earnings 
ratio. Another effective discriminator was the negative relationship of bank 
performance and risk, based on a 36-month regression of bank stock returns. The 
multi-factor model ranked number one among all sectors and was an effective 
discriminator in the finance sector. Jones points out that the finance sector has few 
effective discriminators. 
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3.5.2 Technical Analysis 
Bank literature has started to move away from the sample use of financial ratios in 
the evaluation of a bank. A new focus is on scale efficiencies at a bank or the quest 
for Pareto Optimal technical and allocative efficient points on a firm's cost and 
revenue curves; this is called X-efficiency. Work on scale efficiency suggests that 
the average cost function at a bank is relatively flat, with medium sized firms being 
slightly more scale efficient than either very large or very small firms [Humphrey 
(1990)]. In practical studies in the US, average costs were minimized at between 
$75m and $1 oom for banks with assets of under one billion dollars. Berger et al 
[(1987)], using assets of over one billion dollars, found that the most efficient scale 
was between $2bn and $10bn. Another recent approach to ranking, more specifically 
concerning commercial banks, was conducted by Piyu Yue [(1992)]. Yue used a 
mathematical programming methodology, called Data Enveloping Analysis, to test the 
scale efficiencies at 60 Missouri commercial banks for the period from 1984 to 1990. 
Yue defines economic efficiency in this test to be an optimal mix of inputs to create 
an optimal output on a particular bank's production frontier. This methodology has 
proved significant in analysing a bank's financial condition and management 
performance. Yue points out that for statistical significance, in this type of testing, the 
selection of inputs and outputs is essential. An intermediary approach to financial 
institutions is to treat them as borrowing funds from depositors and lending them to 
others for profits. In these studies, such as in Hancock [(1989)], outputs are loans 
and the inputs are the various costs of these funds, including interest expense, 
labour, capital and operating costs. Another approach viewed banks as institutions 
that use capital and labour to produce loans and deposit account services. In these 
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studies the bank's outputs are their accounts and transactions, while their inputs are 
labour, capital and operating costs. . The bank's interest expenses are excluded in 
these studies. Yue used variants of the intermediary approach where inputs are 
interest expenses, transaction deposits and non-transaction deposits and the outputs 
are interest income, non-interest income and non-transactions deposits. These 
choice variables provided significant results. Another finding ·by Yue, based on these 
tests, is that scale inefficiencies are not an overall major source of inefficiency at 
banks. Yue pointed out that banks simply use too few outputs or too many inputs 
rather than choose the incorrect scale for production. Similar results of insignificant 
scale-inefficiency at US banks have been reported [Aly et al (1990)]. 
3.5.3. The Problem of Smoothed Earnings in Analysis 
The problem of measuring performance at a bank has always been impeded by a 
bank's ability to smooth earnings. Mary Barth, William Beaver and Mark Wolfson 
[(1992)] examined the relationship between common stock prices and two major 
components of bank earnings, securities gains and losses and earnings before 
securities gains and losses. The authors point out that the banking sector is a good 
sector for modelling this relationship because the asset and liability structure of firms 
in the industry are relatively homogenous. They focus on the link between a bank's 
stock price and its earnings, using bank stock prices as the dependant variable; the 
explanatory variables were securities gains and losses and earnings before securities 
gains and losses. Earnings before securities gains and losses arise primarily from 
the deposit and lending activities, with the earnings from this component varying with 
the levels of interest rate returns or interest rate spreads. In contrast, securities gains 
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and losses essentially consist of changes in the market value of investment securities 
since their purchase date. Based on the authors' finding, income from investment 
securities was more volatile and transitory than the other component of earnings. 
Their sample consists of 150 large US banks in the 20 year period from 1968 to 1987. 
The tests by Barth et al showed that the median value for earnings before securities 
gains and losses was stable and constant over this time period, while the returns 
from securities gains and losses were erratic. The behaviour of the latter, the authors 
mentioned, is consistent with the contention. that the expected value of this 
component is zero. Smoothing of earnings is examined by gauging whether changes 
occur at a time when the two components are inversely related, one high the other 
low and vice versa. In most of the sample period when earnings before securities 
gains was below the mean, securities gains and losses was above the mean and. vice 
versa. Barth et al contended that this behaviour accords with the smoothing 
hypothesis of bank earnings. A further finding was that securities gains and losses 
were perceived by the market to smooth earnings and therefore securities gains and 
losses had a negative correlation with share prices and the coefficient of earning 
before securities gains and losses was positive and significant throughout the period. 
The authors concluded that the marginal impact on share prices from greater than 
expected realised security gains are seen by the market as "bad news rather than 
good news". [Barth et al (1992) (24)] 
3.6 Public Policy Impact 
Another consideration in modelling the bank sector is the impact of public policy on 
an institution. Most literature shows a strong significant link between the declaration 
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of public policy and the impact on an institution and its stockholders. Zarruk and 
Madura [(1992)) showed that optimal interest margins at a bank are affected by 
changes in that bank's regulatory parameters. The variables used for modelling 
purposes were the capital to deposits ratio and deposit insurance. They found that 
an increase in the capital to deposits ratio decreased the bank's margin under non-
increasing risk aversion. Similarly an increase in the cost of deposit insurance 
(through higher premiums) reduced optimal interest margins, given constant risk 
aversion. The authors argued that these effects were relevant considerations in any 
restructuring of the financial regulatory process. Another study by Dale K. Osborne 
and Tarek Zaher [(1992)] found a statistically high relationship the following day, after 
a statutory announcement of a decrease in capital reserve requirements, at a bank 
and the rise in the price of bank stock. O'Hare and Shaw [(1990)) showed that 
public policy commitment to support banks, based on the "too big to fail" doctrine, 
had a larger immediate impact on the share prices of bigger banks in the US. 
3. 7. Organisational Structure Theory 
A final aspect being researched is the most efficient organizational structure of a bank 
institution. These studies aim at finding the determinants of the allocative and 
technical efficiencies, X-efficiencies, at a bank. An early study conducted by Fama 
and Jensen [(1993)] showed that mutual finance companies would have greater 
problems associated with the principal-agent relationship because of the greater 
separation of ownership and management control. 
However, Mester [(1993)] showed that mutual savings and loans institutions were 
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more efficient than the stock S & L's, for the same general reasons, which included 
the absence of effective monitoring. His findings were prejudiced, as the sample 
period was during the collapse of the industry. Pi and Timme [(1993)] argued that 
agency costs may be affected when decision management and decision control are 
unified. They used the example of the CEO, who is generally endowed with the most 
power in the decision management process. On the other hand, the Board of 
Directors headed by the chairman, is involved in decision control through monitoring 
and implementation. The concentration of this power in one individual would lead to 
principal and agent conflicts. Pi and Timme found that this affiliation of the Chairman-
CEO is associated with lower efficiency, consistent with expectations. They also 
reported that X-efficiency is positively related to a Nonchairman-CEO relationship. 
They further suggested that team structure is of more importance for X-efficiency than 
a large stockholding by an institution. 
Grabowski et al [(1993)] tested research on decentralised control structures and the 
efficiency of the branch banking system relative to that of the multibank holding 
companies. Branch banking proved consistently more efficient than multibank 
holding companies. The authors suggested that both used the correct amount of 
inputs for overall allocative efficiency but that branch banks have a much higher 
degree of pure technical efficiency, which they say suggested their ability to contain 
costs better than multibanks. Finally, Fare and Primont [(1993)] showed that a single-
unit organizational firm, such as a commercial bank that directly operates a network 
of branches, is more efficient than a multi-unit organization. 
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In summary, the latest bank literature studies have dispelled the argument that 
bigger banks will necessarily achieve a better performance than small banks. In 
addition, a number of studies have shown that a bank merger is not an efficient 
vehicle for effective growth, as measured by the combined inputs. However, a 
positive contribution to the new bank grouping could be realised based on an output 
assessment. It should be mentioned that results are not <?onclusive in this regard. 
Boyd et al [(1992)] recommended that public policy should go as far as curtailing 
mergers between banks and certain nonbanks because of the undue risk attached 
to such an association. Furthermore, fundamental studies have shown that the price 
to earnings ratio is the most effective discriminator in the banking industry [Jones 
(1992)]. Barth et al [(1992)] showed that smoothed earnings at a bank were 
anticipated by share market analysis and therefore the release of a bank's earnings 
performance had little impact on the share price. Finally, studies on the industry have 
shown that there is the need for a bank operation to adopt a decentralised approach, 
to the dissemination of information. The most effective manner of achieving this, 
according to Fare and Primont [(1993)], is through a branch network system. 
The critique on bank theory sets the stage for the next chapter, which records the 
actual mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the South African banking industry, 
most noticeably, after the introduction of the DTI Act. The theory has further 
relevance in the final chapter, when a comparison is made between the performance 
of a big bank and small bank sample in South Africa, between 1988 and 1992. 
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CHAPTER 4:- TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE DTI ACT 
ENCOURAGED THE TREND TOWARDS BIGGER BANKS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1. Introduction 
The year 1991 could be considered as the 'watershed' year for the vast changes that 
took place in the financial services industry. The De Kock Commission Report 
[(1985)], in conjunction with the Basie Accords [(1988)] and the DTI Act 
[(1990)] irrevocably altered South African banking and allied financial industries. The 
DTI Act led to heightened restrictions on capital requirements [DTI Act (1990)], with 
the average capital-to-asset weighting now double the previous requirement, 
increasing to eight percent. In addition, the loosening of ownership criteria meant 
that those financial institutions with a shortage of capital were highly susceptible to 
take-over bids [Jesse (1991) (11)]. 
4.2. The Bank Sample 
In this paper, six South African banks will represent the sample for comparison and 
analysis purposes, during the period 1988 to 1992. 
The three large banks chosen have total assets greaterthan or equal to R45bn. They 
ar~: 
1. Standard Bank Investment Corporation (Stanbic) 
2. First National Bank (FNB) 
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3. Nedbank Corporation (Nedcor) 
The three medium to small banks chosen have total assets between R3bn and R9bn. 
They are: 
1. Investec Bank Group 
2. NBS Bank Group 
3. Boland Bank Group 
All these bank groups are publicly listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
and all are Bank Holding Companies (BHC's). Following from Boyd & Runkle [(1993) 
(40)) a BHC is considered the correct vehicle for analysis because it covers a broad 
array of financial services and also' takes into account the possibility of diversification 
to nonbank subsidiaries. Moreover, a latterday BHC in South Africa should be 
considered as a complete general bank group which is able to supply, inter alia, life 
assurance, bank and building society products. [(Jesse (1991)) 
The initial hypothesis to be tested is that the DTI Act encouraged the trend towards 
• • ••• > •• ~ ........ . 
larger bank groupings in South Africa. In this context each bank forming part of the 
sample will be analyzed separately to determine the, extent of its organic growth 
and/or its growth through acquisitions and mergers. 
4.3. Survey of Big Banks 
4.3.1. Standard Bank Investment Corporation (Stanbic) 
Standard Bank Investment Corporation (Stanbic), at the time of passage of the 
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DTI Act, was jointly controlled at the holding company level by Stanbic shareholders 
and Liberty Life Group Chairman Donald Gordon. This provided Stanbic with indirect 
access to Liberty's subsidiaries; for example, to its controlling stake in British life 
assurer Sunlife and French life assurer UAP Assurance. Standard Bank developed a 
home loan division through organic growth rather than by acquiring a building society-
type institution. The introduction of the unique 'Access Bond' allowed Standard Bank 
to grow it home loan portfolio from zero to R6,5 billion in the· span of four years, 1987 -
1990. [Cape Times (10 June 1991)]. In 1993 Stanbic held 15,7% of the home loan 
market, second only to the Amalgamated Banks of SA (ASSA) which had 39,6% . 
Moreover, Stanbic has traditionally dominated in the market for banking products. In 
1992 Standard Bank was granted the authority to open a banking subsidiary in London 
and in July of that year acquired the Jersey and Isle of Man operations of the British 
merchant bank Brown, Shipley & Company. It should be mentioned that Shouth 
African clandestine bank operations overseas had been replaced with overt banking 
activities, made possible by the peace process in place in the country from 1990. In 
addition, the DTI Act was part of global legislation which enabled financial institutions to 
grow by merger and acquisition, with greater ease. In November 1992, Stanbic 
acquired the Africa operations of ANZ Grindlays Limited and the group now has a 
banking presence in ten countries in Africa. In December 1992 the group acquired a 
majority interest in the Commercial Bank of Madagascar and in the Union Bank of 
Swaziland and Botswana. 
4.3.2. First National Bank (FNB) 
First National Bank (FNB) has also remained relatively stable since the passage of the 
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new DTI Act. This was despite FNB's failed attempt to acquire Allied and NBS 
Buildings Societies. FNB has strong shareholders and is ultimately controlled by the 
Anglo-American Corporation. There are in addition cross-shareholdings between FNB 
and the life assurer, Southern Ufe Assurance. Southern Life holds a 26% stake in 
FNB while the bank holds a 10% stake in the assurer. In 1992 FNB purchased UK 
merchant bank Henry Ansbacher Holdings pie, for 57,~ million pounds. The 
merchant bank also has branches in the Caribbean islands, Channel islands as well 
as in Zurich and Monaco. In Africa, FNB has a presence in Botswana, Namibia and 
Botswana. The group has recently introduced a mass-market bank, Future Bank, into 
the local financial market. This is a 51% black-owned bank and FNB has taken up 
a 49% shareholding. In 1993 FNB purchased the Midlantic Asia Bank in Hong Kong 
for $15 million. 
4.3.3. Nedcor 
Nedcor purchased the SA Permanent Building Society in 1989, helped by the 
legislated appendage to the Building Societies Act, which enabled banks to become 
majority stake holders in mutual societies. Nedcor's major shareholder is the Old 
Mutual Assurance which has a 52% shareholding. In 1991, Nedcor, with the three 
main components of a diversified financial services group in place, extended the 
scope of its operations through a joint venture company between it and South African 
Breweries (SAB) Ltd, named Advantage Investment Corporation (Pty) Ltd. The terms 
of formation included that the Nedcor group would act as SAB's bank, providing 
certain necessary facilities in credit-based retailing, such as short term financing and 
SAB would provide a large client base through its consumer-orientated subsidiaries. 
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This was a unique step to extend links beyond the banking sector. Soon thereafter 
FNB extended its links to the credit-based consumer group, Prefcor Ltd. 
The Nedcor group has established links overseas with a branch network in London, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. The group has also, in 1992, taken a strategic major share 
in bank information technology company MSS Pty (ltd), ~ased in London. In this 
time period, through wholly-owned subsidiaries UAL Merchant bank and SyfretsAsset 
Management Group, the purchase took place of ATC Holdings on the Isle of Man. 
In 1992 Nedcor was also granted access to finance insured by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation of the US and has expanded its import and export credit lines through 
Factor Chain International. 
4.3.4. Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) 
In April 1992 the Bankorp Group, which suffered severely from the imprudent loan 
business generated by subsidiary Trustbank, was acquired by the Amalgamated 
Banks of SA (ASSA). ABSA has since the implementation of the DTI Act acquired the 
Volkskas Bank Group, Allied Building Society, United Building Society and together 
with the Bankorp Group subsidiaries Trustbank, Senbank merchant bank and credit 
instalment financier Bankfin, had total assets of R82,5 billion by the end of the 
Group's financial year, March 1993. Ute assurer Sanlam has a substantial stake in 
the ASSA group. The volume of acquisitions elevated ASSA to the position of the 
largest bank in South Africa by 1993. Furthermore, ASSA has adopted a policy of 
backward integration in the financial services sector, taking major stakes in property 
and allied companies. It currently has substantial shareholdings in Seeff Holdings. 
46 
31,5% holding in Saambou Building Society through the issue of R55m convertible 
debentures. These debentures mature into ordinary share in 1994. The Fedsure-
lnvestec-Saambou combination now represents a R1 Obn financial services group 
although all are independent operational entities. In 1991 the Investec Bank Group 
purchased the mutual society Provincial, for R140m and in 1992 acquired merchant 
bank Allied Trust, based in London, for R185m. 
4.4.2. Rand Merchant Bank (RNB) and Momentum Life Assurance 
Rand Merchant Bank joined up with Momentum Life Assurance to form a financial 
services group with total assets valued at R1 Obn at the end of 1992. The transaction 
meant that Momentum Assurance, the holding company, acquired Rand Merchant 
Bank Holdings (RMBH). RMBH will hold 76,4% of Momentum Holdings, at an 
exchange ratio of R4,40 for one Momentum share. The remainder of the R385m was 
paid to RMBH in cash (R152,2 million). Momentum increased its shareholder base 
by R230m and acquired a 60% stake in RMBH. [Momentum Assurance Annual 
Report 1992] 
4.4.3. NBS Bank Group 
The NBS Bank Group has remained relatively independent and has opted for organic 
growth as a diversified financial services group. The group has a 30% shareholding 
in Norwich Union Assurance. It also has a 49% stake in the French Bank of SA, 
which is a subsidiary of multi-national financial conglomerate, the lndosuez 
Corporation. In 1993 the NBS Bank, together with Momentum, took up a joint 
shareholding in short term assurer, Aegis for a total consideration of R181 million. 
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Momentum has a marginal holding in the NBS bank group and the life assurer is 
noticeably devoid of home loan business. In 1993 RMBH took up an 18% stake 
worth R225m in the NBS group. 
4.4.4. Boland Bank 
Boland Bank has remained a small bank providing general banking services. It is a 
Paarl-based organisation that began as a bank providing a financial service for 
farmers. Boland Bank has, over time, branched out to cover general banking 
business and now offers a broader range of financial products. In 1993, the bank 
group's dominant shareholders, the ASSA Group, Sanlam and the tobacco 
organisation the Rembrandt Group, sold their shares to, inter a/ia, the Cape-based 
financial institution Board of Executors (BoE). BoE now holds the equivalent of a 
30, 1 % stake in the bank, in the form of redeemable-compulsory convertible 
debentures estimated at R74 million. This is considered to be the beginning of 
another large bank group formation. 
Finally in 1994 a smaller bank amalgamation occurred with mutual society EP 
Building Society and publicly listed Fidelity Bank merging to form a bank group with 
total assets of R1 ,8 billion. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Since the DTI Act was introducted three large new bank formations have been 
formed, namely the ASSA Group, the lnvestec-Fedlife-Saambou combination and 
Rand Merchant Bank-Momentum Life, with the NBS group drawing closer to the latter 
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alliance. Moreover, the Boland Bank Group and BoE have moved closer together 
and Fidelity Bank and the EP Building Society have merged. Therefore in conclusion, 
prima facie, the trend towards mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry 
seemingly accelerated after the implementation of the DTI Act in February 1991. It 
is further clear that banks in this period were primed towards gaining market share 
organically but more predominantly through an acquisition or merger. Those that 
control the decision-making process at BHC's demonstrated this preference with their 
pre-disposition towards mergers. 
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CHAPTER 5:- TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS THAT BIG BANKS ARE 
BETTER PERFORMING BANKS THAN SMALL BANKS 
5.1. Introduction to SA Bank Shares 
The Banks Index comprises 4,5% of the All-Share Index on-the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange. [JSE Handbook (1992)] In the period from 1960 to 1992, the Banks 
Index has been highly volatile when measured against the Financial & Industrial 
Index. [see Fig 2] 
In a paper delivered by South African bank analyst Richard Jesse to the Financial 
Mail Conference [(1991)] it was pointed out that: 
11Historically South African bank shares 
have tended to show clear uptrends and 
downtrends against the market - bank 
shares are therefore considered to be part of 
an actively managed portfolio. 11 [Jesse (1991) (5)] 
Jesse also showed that there were inconsistent share price movements in this sector. 
Jesse used share price movements before and after the October crash in 1987 to 
illustrate this point. In August 1987, FNB was at a share price of R20,50 and 
appreciated by a further 17% to an after-the-crash price of R24 per share, Stanbic 
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remained unchanged. In accordance with a high Beta-coefficient [refer to Fig. 2] 
BHC's have had wide disparities in earnings and dividend growth over this period, 
which led to large fluctuations in their respective share price. Jesse has argued that 
small banks may tend to have a higher Beta coefficient than do big banks, simply 
because their ability to adjust to economic changes must be less complex than a 
large organisation. In 'good times' the earnings growth sl")ould be steeper and in 
'bad times' the fall would be of the same nature, but of a negative sign. [Jesse 
(1991) (20)] 
The period after the introduction of the DTI Act was vastly different from the banking 
industry, before the arrival of the Act. Certain banking strategies that dominated the 
earlier period have now been ruled out and this could prevent volatility in bank 
performances in the future. [McConnochie (1) (1992)]. McConnochie argues that 
banks adopted the antiquated method of opting for volume growth to gain market 
share, without strict credit and risk analyses. This may partially explain a good 
earnings performance in buoyant economic times and bad performances when the 
economy is in recession. Jesse [(1991)] points out that the maximum incidence of 
bad debts, from loan business, is considered to occur soon after the economy has 
reached its nadir. Commercial banks, historically, have been able to balance their 
risks associated with loan business since, when the economy was in recession, 
normally linked to a period of high interest rates, a commercial bank obtained 
deposits at a low rate and the funds were then loaned out at the market-related prime 
overdraft rate. 
"The commercial bank has had the fairly 
unique opportunity, relative to the rest 
of the financial services industry, in being 
able to balance volume growth and interest margins. 
The tendency was to balance low volume growth with 
higher interest margins and vice versa". 
[McConnochie (1) (1992) (8)] 
5.2. The Interest Rate Cycle 
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The interest rate cycle has an important effect on all bank profits. [SA Reserve Bank 
Supervision Report (1992)]. To provide some indication of the importance of interest 
margins, in 1992 interest received made up 83% of total financial institution income. 
The period under observation here, 1988 to 1992, showed that profits from this 
source were highly unstable as the prime overdraft interest rate rose fom 13% in 1988 
to a 21,25% high in 1990, before falling to 17,25% by the end of 1992. In this five 
year period loans and advances made up 84% of the total assets held by financial 
institutions. These were made up of a 34% holding of mortgage loans and 31% in 
overdraft and credit cards facilities. In addition, there were minor holdings of bills, 
foreign currency loans, resales under agreement and instalment debtors. Data 
suggests that financial institutions were cutting back on volume growth over this 
period, with total credit extended in the bank sector falling, from an annual increase 
of over 35% in 1988 to a 15% annual increase by the end of 1992. [Ibid (1992)] 
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Building Societies, inherently, have relatively stable asset portfolios from mortgage 
loans. However the collapse of the Savings & Loans Institutions in the US, and 
Masterbond in SA, are examples of bad management turning such low risk assets 
into high level bad debts. [(McConnochie (1) (1992)] Nevertheless, we argue here 
that in the case of prudent asset management a diversified asset portfolio, through 
the merger or acquisition of separate businesses allied to the financial services 
industry, could assist in smoothing the rate of return and this could, in turn, be a 
factor in smoothing or stabilising a bank's share price. In an empirical sense and 
prima facie a diversified financial services group has merits. However bank theory 
has found that there are no cost benefits from a bank merger to create a diversified 
financial services group but there is partial verification when analysing bank mergers 
from a perspective of revenue generation. 
5.3. Testing Banking Performance in South Africa 
5.3.1 Measuring Individual Bank Performance 
A comparison of six banks -- three big banks and three smaller banks -- introduced 
in the previous chapter, will now be undertaken to measure performance over the 
designated sample period. The six banks are all publicly-listed institutions operating 
as deposit takers under the new bank guidelines. The comparison will consist of a 
size variable of each bank measured against a market-related variable .. 
The performance measure is the price earnings (PE) ratio, which has proved to be 
the most successful measure for the banking industry [Jones (1990)]. This ratio 
measures the number of times the share price of a publicly-listed company covers 
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its earnings per share based on its financial statements. It is a rating using earnings 
of an individual company as a benchmark in nJeasuring share performance. The PE 
ratio contains a future expectation component in the current share price and earnings 
per share is based on historical data. Thererfore a high PE ratio is normally 
associated with positive investor sentiment and a low PE ratio is associated with 
negative investor sentiment. Following from Boyd et al [(1993)] gross advances have 
been selected as the size indicator. Gross advances, for consistency purposes, are 
made up of advance, acceptances, guarantees, debtors, remittances and transfers 
at an individual bank. The sample period, as already stated, extends from 1988 to 
1992 and the data has been collected at the respective bank's year end. 
The data will be projected graphically, with the PE ratio represented on the y-axis and 
gross advances on the x-axis. Measurements of each bank will be based on their 
respective PE ratios and gross advances and this will be mapped on to five separate 
charts, from 1988 to 1992. A higher market rating is anticipated, we argue, to relate 
to size. A graphic comparison will also be conducted to measure the performance 
of a mean big bank sample against that of a mean small bank sample for the 
designated period. 
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TABLE 5. 1 The PE ratios and Gross Advances of Big Banks 
BIG BANKS 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Gross Advances Sn's Sn's Sn's Sn's Sn's 
Standard Bank R25,2 R33,7 R39,6 R45,9 R57,4 
FNB R23,6 R25,7 R26,4 R33,2 R39,4 
NEDCOR R12,5 R22,3 R26,8 R32,9 R35,6 
PE Ratios 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Standard Bank 5,8 6,8 7 10,2 12,4 
FNB 5,4 4,5 6,2 9,1 9,8 
NEDCOR 5,4 6,6 7, 1 7,2 7,4 
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TABLE 5.2 The PE ratios and Gross Advances of Small Banks 
SMALL BANKS 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Gross Advances Bn's Bn's Bn's Bn's Bn's . 
NBS R2,7 R3,5 R4,6 R 6 R7,6 
Boland R1 ,4 R1 ,8 R2,3 R2,6 R2,8 
Investec R0,402 R0,650 R1,2 R1,9 R2,3 
PE Ratios 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
NBS 6,4 6,3 7,8 9,5 10 
Boland 5,4 4,8 4 5,7 7,5 
Investec 6,8 6 7,7 11,6 14, 1 
Figures '3(a) to 3(e) graphically depicts the market rating of each individual bank 
relative to its size, for the period of 1988 to 1992. 
5.3.1.1 Commentary on the Graphs 
There is little evidence that in the period between 1988 and 1992 a positive 
relationship existed between market rating and the size of an individual bank. In 
fact, in 1992 [Fig. 3(e)] Investec Bank Group was the smallest size in terms of gross 
advances, yet had the highest market rating on the share market. It is also evident 
that between 1988 and 1992 each bank's market rating, in general grew, as did each 
bank's holdings of gross advances. A link therefore exists, we argue, between the 
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perceived quality of an individual bank's volume growth and an individual bank's 
performance. To support this assertion the Bankorp Group, which was acquired by 
ABSA in 1992, had a PE ratio that declined even though its size, as defined, 
increased in the sample period. Boland Bank also suffered a downrating even 
though its total assets increased. McConnochie argued ((2) (1992)] that this was 
because it's growth was in the farming community at the time of the local drought. 
Boland Bank's shift to a more balanced client portfolio and a wider array of financial 
services could in some part be reflected in its re-rating in 1991 and 1992. Boland 
bank's approach was to re-position new branches to gain a broader spectrum of 
client. The coming together of Boland Bank and BoE will provide an additional 
dimension for Boland, in terms of merchant banking and asset management 
business. The NBS Bank moved, in this period, away from its traditional home loan 
business and now offers a greater variety of commercial bank services. The NBS 
Bank's approach has been to focus on organic growth, making its own entry into new 
markets. However a strategic alliance has also been formed with Momentum 
Assurance. 
Investec Bank Group's customers were traditionally the professional market, which 
provided the institution with a stable asset portfolio. It has made strategic 
acquisitions and now covers virtually all areas of the financial service industry. These 
aspects have helped Investec to gain the highest return on assets on average from 
1988 to 1992 -- a return on assets of 1,56% compared with an average for big banks 
0.89%. It also had the highest market rating based on the PE ratio -- three out of the 
five years. NBS Bank had the highest market rating in 1990 providing an opportunity 
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for a big bank (Stanbic), to rank highest only once in the observation period. 
FNB's performance was hindered in this period by internal restructuring, which 
included the implementation of the Hogan computer system, which allows for a 
branch network organisational structure. The benefits of such a system accord with 
faster decision-making, arising from decentralised information. FNB was 
downgraded, based on the PE ratio, in 1988 and 1989, during the introductory phase 
of the restructure, before experiencing a sharp rerating with the realised successful 
implementation of this branch system structure. [McConnochie (3) (1992)) In 
comparison, Stanbic could be considered as a single operational structure although 
it has been positioned, in recent times, to assimilate information at a regional level. 
Nedcor has opted for a divisional strategy, with a central command structure 
overseeing the six divisions below. The organisational structure is associated with 
a multibank strategy. Boland Bank, Investec and the NBS are single operational 
structures. However the recent link of Investec Holdings, with, inter alia, Fedsure and 
Saambou also resembles a multibank formation. McConnochie [(2) (1992)) argues 
that the above-mentioned grouping can now access accurate information at the three-
pronged corporate control level. 
5.3.2. Comparison of Big Banks versus Small Banks 
The next part of the process of analysing these South African banks is to compare 
the average performance of the three big banks with the average performance os the 
three small banks in the sample period of 1988 to 1992. Here comparisons between 
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small banks and big banks are conducted on a single graph to encapsulate 
performance over time. 
TABLE 5.3:- Mean Big Bank PE ratio and Gross Advances from 1988 
to 1992. 
BIG BANKS 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Gross Advances 
(billions) R20,4 R27,2 R30,9 R37,3 R44,1 
PE Ratio 5,5 5,97 6,77 8,8 9,9 
TABLE 5.4:- Mean Small Banks PE ratios and Gross Advances from 
1988 to 1992. 
SMALL BANKS 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Gross Advances 
(billions) R 1,7 R 2,4 R 3,1 R 4,1 R 4,8 
PE Ratio 6,2 5,7 6,5 8,9 10,53 
'"tgure 3(TJ:- the graphic comparison of the performance ot b1g banks as against that 
of small banks. 
5.3.2.1 Commentary on the Graphs 
It is evident that big banks did not have a superior market rating to small banks in the 
Comparison of Big Banks .vs Smali Banks 





















10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 
GA (billions) 
66 
sample period. In fact, in three of the five years small banks, on average, had higher 
market ratings. Small banks underwent a sharp re-rating in the years leading up to 
the implementation of the DTI Act [Figure 3mJ. This should provide evidence, we 
argue, that these "niche" or selective banks are considered as an important part of 
the new bank environment based on their share market performance. Big banks had 
more gradual growth in their market ratings between 1988 c,ind 1992, which was in 
line with the re-rating of the financial services sector in general. This could be 
explained, in part, by the fact that the banking industry experienced a period of high 
earnings growth as a result of interest rate fluctuations. This afforded most financial 
institutions the opportunity of benefiting from higher margins when interest rates 
increased and allowed for a slower rate of decline in bank charges when interest 
· rates declined [Jesse (1991)]. Moreover, there are also the advantages associated 
with the greater returns during a volatile period in the interest rate cycle. Small 
banks, on average, were able to take greater advantage of their positioning in 
selective markets to increase their earnings performance, during this period. 
However the counter argument is that they are unable to balance a decline in 
earnings from a single revenue source [Jesse (1991)]. To this extent a small bank 
-··· 
in general would tend to have a higher Beta than a big bank [McConnochie (1) 
(1992)]. On average small banks gross advances went up by 141% from R1 ,7bn to 
R4,1bn, in the period, while the big banks grew advances by 116% from R20,4bn to 
R44,1bn. 
Big banks, we argue, were able to assure a smooth earnings performance because 
of diversified incomes. This resulted in a consistent uptrend in their rating in the 
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sample period. Small banks are perceived to be unable to achieve a diversified 
earnings balance and therefore there was the decline, in terms of its PE rating, 
between 1988 and 1989. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The future of the financial services industry will depend on the extent to which quality 
credit information can be transmitted effectively across geographic distance and 
between different economic organisations and communities. A financial institution's 
ability to evaluate and control credit risk at a distance will importantly influence both 
the industry's likely future scale and the extent of its eventual consolidation [McAllister 
& McManus (1993)]. 
Decentralised banking structures are considered more flexible and pro-active in 
disseminating and reacting to information. Small banks, for that very reason, are able 
to react with immediacy to new information through a more efficient decision-making 
and implementation process. Big banks have taken cognisance of this and divisional 
strategies in large organisations are starting to emerge, in essence forming niche 
operations within the organisation [McConnochie (1993)]. Looking at specific 
examples, the concentration of command has filtered down to branch level in the 
case of FNB and with the Nedcor group the command centre has been broken down 
into financial product divisions, while Stanbic has spread its command centre to its 
regions. Investec and NBS Bank could be described as being in the embryonic 
stages of becoming part of a multibank structure. Boland bank is also likely to 
decentralise information in a divisional structure with closer links to BoE. 
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The mass market has been, and will continue to be, a problematic area for BHC's. 
FNB, Nedcor and Stanbic have adopted divisional strategies to accomodate this 
sector of the South African population. FNB has recently started Future Bank, which 
is a bank focused exclusively on the black market and Nedcor's mass market home 
loans are conducted through the SA Perm. Stanbic has recently launched a 
subsidiary, E-Bank, which plans,. in the same manner, to focus on the black market. 
In addition, former managing director of the Perm, Bob Tucker is currently working 
on a project to evaluate the efficiency of community banks based on the mutual 
society concept. 
A few words are appropriate on the ABSA Bank, the largest institution in South Africa, 
but left out of this sample survey as no consistent data could be obtained from an 
organisation in a continual state of flux in the period under review. However the 
different brand names in the group would allow ASSA to successfully adopt a 
multibank strategy in filtering commands to decentralise information. 
The conclusion can be drawn that 11big 11 is not necessarily 11better11 in the South African 
bank industry. Big banks could be better banks, we argue, should they adopt 
decentralised strategies. We argue that the trend is towards large bank groups but 
point out that small banks will be able to compete successfully in a specific niche 
market. Moreover, we conclude that niche banks would need to enhance their 
associations to diversify into allied financial services. 
In summary, we argu~ that size has very little relevance to individual financial markets 
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and performance instead rests on strategic positioning in those markets. Size, 
crucially, does allow for a far swifter access to information across the entire financial 
services sector. Small banks, we argue, seemingly realised that an association was 
important in the financial services industry and big banks have realised that 
information can only be properly disseminated in a decentralised structure. This we 
argue would explain the trend of small banks to enlarge th~ir links in the sector and 
for big banks to break down their structures into small parts. 
The ultimate conclusion from this thesis is that size is not a good indicator of market 
rating or performance at a bank. A large bank is reliant on its individual parts, some 
stronger than others in a diversified group. Those individual parts of a bank group 
are more relevant, we argue, than the organisation as a whole. From this viewpoint 
size would be immaterial in determining performance in a specific market. The 
superior ranking of small banks over big banks in the sample period observed, could 
be seen as demonstrating support for niche banking strategies. 
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